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Monday, May 20, 2013

LinkedIn: 3 tips for building a better profile

Image representing LinkedIn as depicted in Cru...
Image via CrunchBase
CBS News
By 
AMY LEVIN-EPSTEIN / 
MONEYWATCH/ May 20, 2013, 7:00 AM

LinkedIn
LinkedIn (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
(MoneyWatch) Recently, this blog offered a "how-to" on spring-cleaning your resume. Like that document, your LinkedIn profile should constantly evolve along with your experience and interests. Frequent updates keep the content current, and new activity enables you to stay on people's digital radar. If you've already mastered the basics of LinkedIn -- a great profile photo, for instance -- here are three more advanced tips from Nicole Williams, LinkedIn's career expert.
Use LinkedIn Today, today
LinkedIn Today allows you to customize your page through subscriptions to channels for real-time news coming from influential people, periodicals and industries. Topics range from social impact to higher education to innovation to big ideas. "Adding these channels will keep the conversation growing and evolving on LinkedIn and at the office," says Williams.
Try the LinkedIn Professional Portfolio
This new feature helps job seekers to improve the visual appeal of their profile with photos, presentations and videos imbedded in their employment history. "Customizing your profile on LinkedIn will make it much more compelling to view by your community as well as by hiring managers, clients and colleagues," says Williams. "This feature truly lets your work speak for itself." Contacts can comment on or like your work, which can naturally start a conversation about future projects or jobs.
List all your experience
Williams notes that a profile with more than one job listed is 12 times more likely to be viewed than one with a single job. And it doesn't matter if you've changed industries. "One great example is a friend who said, 'I used to work in nursing years back and now I'm in marketing. There's no connection.' It turns out that Johnson & Johnson was looking for someone who had a background in health care, and that was what ended up differentiating her," recalls Williams. Even internships and volunteer work can help you come up in key word searches as a probable recruiting match.
What's your favorite LinkedIn trick or tool? Please sign in and share in the comments section.  
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Amy Levin-Epstein is a freelance writer who has been published in dozens of magazines (including Glamour, Self and Redbook), websites (including AOLHealth.com, Babble.com and Details.com) and newspapers (including The New York Post and the Boston Globe). To read more of her writing, visit AmyLevinEpstein.com.




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A Powerful Stock Price Predictor

Exhaustive research shows that profit and revenue don’t actually predict stock price, but some other, little-used metrics do.
CFO.com:
David McCann



A new study provides perhaps the strongest evidence to date that certain human-capital metrics can predict a company’s performance in the stock markets.
The research was nothing if not robust. Through extensive use of regression analysis, it tested the relationships between a set of human-capital metrics and stock-price movements at 22,100 companies over a 16-year period, 1996 through 2011.
Graziadio School of Business and Management
Graziadio School of Business and Management (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
A key finding of the study – performed by Jeff Higgins, CEO of the Human Capital Management Institute, and Pepperdine University professor Donald Atwater – may surprise investors, stock analysts and finance executives themselves.
Generally speaking, a company’s net income and to a lesser extent revenue are considered the gold standards for shaping expectations of its stock’s future performance. ... In fact, both are statistically insignificant, as is pure net profit without association with any human-capital metrics.
Instead, two metrics used by some human-capital analysts, ... are powerful predictors of stock price, the research found. One, called “Return on Human Capital Investment” (Return on HCI), compares “Total Cost of Workforce” (TCOW) to net operating profit. (TCOW includes: all direct and indirect cash or equity compensation for employees and contingent workers; paid employee benefits, perks and rewards; retirement-related costs for both current and former employees; and costs for worker training, recruiting, employee relations, and severance and legal settlements.)
The other highly predictive metric is “Human Capital ROI Ratio.” It measures the ratio of return on revenue (net of non-workforce expenses) to TCOW. For example, say a company has $1 billion in revenue and $800 million in total expenses, $500 million of which are people costs. To arrive at HC ROI ratio, subtract the $300 million nonpeople costs from revenue, leaving $700 million, and divide that by the $500 million in people costs.
English: Human Capital Investment Model!!
English: Human Capital Investment Model!! (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
In essence, the two metrics are different ways of measuring the percentage return on $1 invested in the work force, assuming all other factors remain constant. In the above example for Human Capital ROI Ratio, the result is expressed as 1.40, or a 40-cents positive return on the invested dollar. ...
“Everyone thinks net profit drives stock price,” says Higgins, a former CFO, “and in my old finance world I thought so too. But what really drives stock price is productivity. Some might say Return on HCI and Human Capital ROI Ratio are synthetic profit metrics, but we see them as productivity metrics – the return on people’s productivity. And when those numbers improve, your stock price jumps.”...
On average, given a 10 percent gain in the three most predictive human-capital metrics – Return on HCI, Human Capital ROI Ratio and TCOW as a percentage of operating expense – stock price jumped by 5.73 percent. By comparison, a 10 percent boost in net income was associated with a stock-price increase of just 0.8 percent. ...
Good performance in profit or revenue per FTE can actually mask otherwise dismal results. For example, the investment banking subsector of the financial services and insurance sector saw median revenue per FTE climb by 21.8 percent over the study period. But median Human Capital ROI Ratio dropped by 29 percent while TCOW ballooned by 47.5 percent, negatively affecting investment banks’ share prices.
Those results, says Higgins – who got his start in the human-capital-management field when he left his finance career to take a job running compensation at IndyMac Bank – portray fewer and fewer high-earning employees getting paid an ever-larger share of industry revenue. It calls into question whether investment-bank shareholders have been properly rewarded for their investments, he notes.
Clearly, there are many reasons behind the rise and fall of stock prices, including macroeconomic ones not under a company’s control. In addition to net income for each company, variables controlled for by regression analyses included real gross domestic product, bank prime loan rate, actual vs. natural unemployment rate, producer price index, consumer price index, industrial production index and S&P 500 index. The study found that even after controlling for those variables, human-capital metrics had significant predictive capability.
But even better was a model employing those factors plus the three most predictive human-capital metrics mentioned above. The model explained from 35% to 64% of movements in stock price, depending on industry sector, according to the study report.
Net profit by itself, without a connection to any human-capital metrics, explained only 1 percent of stock-price movements, the authors wrote.
“If there is an actual statistical or causal link [showing that] human-capital investments do indeed positively impact financial outcomes, then it forms the foundation for ROI-based business cases for [such investments],” the study report states. ...
The idea that human-capital metrics are linked with performance in the equity markets is not new. Groundbreaking research showing a link between training expenditures and stock price was done in the 1990s, and later updated to include additional such links, by Laurie Bassi, a labor economist who is CEO of consulting firm McBassi & Co. Other leaders in the field have included Jac Fitz-enz and Nick Bontis (Fitz-enz actually invented the Human Capital ROI Ratio metric).
Bassi, a registered investment advisor, since 2001 has been operating a fund, populated with stocks of companies known to be leaders in the field of human-capital management, that has significantly outperformed the S&P 500 index.



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Tuesday, April 16, 2013

The Agility Factor

A few large companies in every industry show consistently superior profitability relative to their peers, and they all have one thing in common: a highly developed capacity to adapt their business to change.

strategy+business magazine:

Everybody knows that big corporations, by nature, maneuver like battleships. Held back by their own inertia and current business strategies, they cannot turn quickly when the competitive environment changes. Everybody also knows that high performance, as measured by shareholder returns, is impossible to sustain over the long term; no company consistently beats the market.
But a recent in-depth study of long-term performance suggests an alternative point of view about business strategy. When the measure of performance is profitability, a few large companies in every industry consistently outperform their peers over extended periods. And they maintain this performance edge even in the face of significant business change in their competitive environments. The one factor they seem to have in common is agility. They adapt to business change more quickly and reliably than their competitors; they have found a way to turn as quickly as speedboats when necessary.
ExxonMobil is a good example. Throughout the 1980s, when it was still just Exxon, it was the largest, most profitable oil and gas company in the world. ...
T
Portrait of Lee Raymond
Portrait of Lee Raymond (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
hen in 1989, Exxon fell from grace. ... When Lee Raymond took over from Lawrence Rawl as chairman in April 1993, Exxon had dropped on Fortune’s list of most admired companies from number six to 110. As Raymond noted in a rare interview, a good day for him was one in which “Exxon” or his name did not appear in the papers.
Many companies would have reacted by putting in place short-term fixes and doing whatever they could to return to their old ways of operating. Instead, Exxon quietly moved to internalize the lessons of the Valdez spill and to build the capabilities required for future profitability. ... Recognizing that external upheavals could occur at any time, the company relentlessly drove for efficiency over the 1990s—a fortunate move because oil prices continued to fall throughout the decade. Exxon ... improved its exploration capability (where it had historically lagged behind its competitors), and pushed production efficiency even harder. Through all these measures, and by taking full advantage of the innate discipline for which it was known, Exxon halved its cost of finding oil and greatly improved its exploration success rate. In 1995, Lee Raymond was able to say, “Exxon is now much more efficient at getting on with it.”
Exxon’s focus on execution, technical excellence, and capital efficiency positioned the firm well to exploit the rise in oil prices that began in 1998. In 1999, Raymond, dubbed by Businessweek as the “anti-celebrity CEO,” engineered the largest acquisition in history to that point, and one of the most successful, with Exxon’s purchase of Mobil. In 2000, the combined company became the most profitable in history, a ranking it still holds today, and launched a new series of exploration initiatives to spur growth in oil and gas reserves.
The pattern of adaptation Exxon exhibited is not typical of most large companies. It represents an unusual ability to successfully respond to and learn from external events, to innovate technically and organizationally, and to plan and execute new courses of action. In short, Exxon demonstrated a rare and distinctive ability to continually and successfully adapt to changing circumstances. We call this “agility.” Today, when every industry faces turbulent change as a matter of course, a company’s agility becomes the difference between sustaining performance and falling behind.

Agility and Performance

A closer look at the record of Exxon and other large, public companies, from a variety of industries, supports this link between agility and consistent high performance. We studied the financial performance of 243 large firms in 17 industries over the 30-year period from 1979 to 2009.
Like others before us, we concluded that stock prices and shareholder returns cannot tell a story about sustained performance. ... Exxon and ExxonMobil stock languished through the 1990s, for instance, despite exemplary performance during the dot-com craze.
Thus, instead of relying on total shareholder return (TSR) or its even more misleading cousin, cumulative shareholder return, we looked at return on assets (ROA)—a meaningful proxy for profitability in many companies and a better indicator of management’s effectiveness. (Only one of the 17 industries we studied—financial services and insurance—lacked any kind of reasonable asset base. For this industry, we used return on equity as a more relevant proxy for profitability.) In every industry we studied, there were two or three “outperformers”: companies that achieved above-average industry ROA performance more than 80 percent of the time. Altogether, this group made up 16 percent of the sample. Exxon was a member; between 1979 and 2009, its ROA exceeded the industry average 97 percent of the time.
Among the other companies, we found two common performance patterns. About 18 percent of the sample were “underperformers,” whose profitability was below the industry average 80 percent or more of the time. The remaining 66 percent of the sample were “thrashers”; their profitability oscillated between underperformance and outperformance relative to the industry average.
Image representing IBM as depicted in CrunchBase
Image via CrunchBase
ExxonMobil is one of only two outperformers in the oil and gas industry. The other is Royal Dutch Shell PLC (see Exhibit 1). Outperformers in other industries include Campbell Soup, DaVita, GlaxoSmithKline, Honda, Johnson Controls, Limited Brands, Nike, Nokia, and Svenska Handelsbanken. Thrashers include BP, Procter & Gamble, IBM, Toyota, Pfizer, and Apple—all highly regarded companies that have received business accolades and spectacular press at times, but that tend to be admired for their peaks and forgiven for their valleys. Meanwhile, Exxon, Shell, and other outperformers, despite their occasional stumbles, more consistently deliver the goods.
To complete the link between agility and performance, we surveyed more than 4,700 directors and executives from 56 companies (including outperformers, underperformers, and thrashers), 34 of which were Fortune 500 firms included in the financial database. We asked about the way their organizations formulated strategy, designed their structures and processes, led their people, and changed and innovated. We also interviewed executives at 19 of the Fortune 500 firms.
When we compared our survey and interview data with the performance data, we observed a strong relationship between a company’s basic approach to management and its long-term profitability patterns. When markets and technologies changed rapidly and unpredictably—as they did in every industry over these 30 years—the outperformers had the capability to anticipate and respond to events, solve problems, and implement change better than thrashers. They successfully adapted. They were agile.

What Is Agility?

Agility is ... a cultivated capability that enables an organization to respond in a timely, effective, and sustainable way when changing circumstances require it. The management literature increasingly refers to this ability as a “dynamic capability”: the potential to sense opportunities and threats, solve problems, and change the firm’s resource base. This allows outperformers to maintain or enhance their relative advantages in ways their competitors fail to see or do not fully implement. Agility is also strategically relevant: Although agile organizations often change, they do not pursue change for change’s sake. They pursue it for the sake of competitive advantage.
Four routines, summarized in Exhibit 2, below, distinguish the high-performing organizations from the thrashers and underperformers. These companies have the ability to strategize in dynamic ways; accurately perceive changes in their external environment; test possible responses; and implement changes in products, technology, operations, structures, systems, and capabilities as a whole. Importantly, it is the whole system of routines, not the possession of one or two of them, that confers agility. ...[The] hard work necessary to orchestrate them for consistent high performance is advanced and uncommon. By executing these routines in concert, over and over again, the outperformers consistently outpaced competitors.
Strategizing dynamically. ... [Agile] organizations don’t define strategy the way other firms do. For them, strategy has three explicit parts: a sense of shared purpose, a change-friendly identity that is nonetheless stable enough to ground the organization, and a robust strategic intent that clarifies how the firm differentiates itself.
The Capital One Financial Corporation, ... demonstrates all three elements of strategizing dynamically. It has a widely shared and well-understood sense of purpose that is codified in its mission statement and business model. ...
Capital One’s change-friendly identity is embodied in a phrase that its managers often use in conversation: “test and learn.” ...
The company’s ongoing business strategy—its strategic intent—also enables it to embrace continuous change. Capital One is known for its willingness to rapidly shift its operations (for example, the range of customer segments served, channels used, or products offered); to adjust the aggressiveness of its marketing, customer support, new product development, or R&D; and to modify the features it offers consumers. Capital One seeks its competitive advantage not through a single product line or approach, but through an ongoing series of temporary advantages that exploit current business conditions.
Perceiving environmental change. Agile companies take special care to accurately sense what is going on in the environment. Managers and employees are put into direct contact with customers, regulators, and other stakeholders through multiple touch points, structures, and practices, and they are expected to gather intelligence. They communicate their perceptions of the external world to company decision makers who have the support and knowledge they need to interpret those messages as important or unimportant, opportunity or threat. All three elements of perceiving environmental change are essential. Sensing without communicating is wasteful; communicating without interpreting is just noise.
DaVita HealthCare Partners Inc., a Fortune 500 kidney care organization with more than 1,840 dialysis centers, has an effective, institutionalized perceiving routine. To keep all employees focused on the external environment, DaVita abandoned the organization chart. ... DaVita’s management system orients each local dialysis center to the needs of patients, physicians, and the community. Meanwhile, central management concentrates on activities that deliver future value for the corporation—they charter teams to build leaders, research the implications of healthcare reform, identify M&A prospects, and develop new business. One of these teams identified and pursued a recent merger with HealthCare Partners. This process also identified international dialysis as a potential business opportunity.
This external focus is supported by a hard-and-fast rule that moves information up the hierarchy: “Whenever there is a director and three or more team members in a room, there’s a town hall meeting.” In these meetings, any question can be asked about any subject. If the director doesn’t have an answer, the question goes into his or her email and has to be answered within 48 hours.
All that information—from dialysis centers and initiative teams—gets funneled to top management for consideration. ... At DaVita, different top management teams are accountable for different purposes. That allows the company to assign people with the right expertise to various questions and issues, and improves their ability to interpret signals from their externally focused organization.
Thrashers and underperformers, with inward-looking and politicized management, find this level and intensity of communication congenitally difficult. They are too busy vying for turf, resources, and position to dispassionately consider the implications of outside signals. The external focus of agile companies enables them to face up to brutal facts and separate wheat from chaff.
Testing responses. Agile organizations refine their insights from the perceiving routine with a relatively high number of low-cost experiments. They encourage innovation and tolerate a good deal of failure. ... In most cases, there are explicit risk management processes—with valid success criteria so the plug can be pulled if the test fails—and continuous learning efforts so that the insights gained from the tests spread to all relevant parts of the company. Agile organizations invest significantly in learning and continuous improvement, never resting on their laurels or believing they have “cracked the code” once and for all.
The Limited Brands has both informal and formal testing routines that help the apparel retail chain keep pace with fashion trends and competition. Managers get in the habit of asking one another, “What’s new, what’s next?” This connects everyone in the organization, from senior managers to store merchants, to the observations and data they’ve gathered, ... and pushes them to consider what they are going to do about it. The “what’s new, what’s next” mantra keeps them on their toes. At the store level, small-scale testing procedures make it easy to try out new concepts, point-of-purchase displays, and product extensions. Consumer responses to small-scale tests are vetted by managers, and investment decisions follow successful ideas. Two of the Limited’s blockbuster retail brands—Victoria’s Secret and Bath and Body Works—got started this way. Their success as small experiments inside existing retail stores caught management’s attention and led to big commitments from CEO Les Wexner.
To enable these tests, agile organizations are not always and everywhere “lean and mean.” They must consciously build in extra organizational slack—investing in people, money, and time that don’t go directly to the bottom line, but allow the agile organization to rapidly deploy resources against opportunities that may or may not pay off, without jeopardizing day-to-day operations. The higher staffing levels also play an important role in capturing and disseminating learning that the organization can use later.
Implementing change. Agile companies have mastered the internal program management capabilities they need to convert successful tests and promising innovations into widespread practices. ... These companies have histories of successful transformations, restructurings, and merger integrations, and they also excel at the execution of new product rollouts, policy changes, and compliance mandates, as Exxon demonstrated after the Valdez spill.
The Swedish bank Svenska Handelsbanken is built on the principle of radical decentralization, and its record of financial success is unmatched; the recent financial crisis hardly dented performance. Guided by a change-friendly identity and the slogan “the branch is the bank,” branch managers are responsible for financial results and have the budget authority to take action. They control marketing decisions (except when a new product common to all branches is being launched), staffing levels, salaries, and property lease costs. In addition, on average, half of a branch’s staff has lending authority, permitting customers to receive answers very quickly. Branch managers are held accountable for results and continuous improvement by a “relative performance measurement system” that transparently compares all branches on a quarterly basis. At the end of the year, a performance-based profit-sharing system for all employees is triggered when the organization’s after-tax return on shareholders’ equity (excluding extraordinary items) is higher than the average for other Nordic banks. One-third of the excess amount is placed in an employee fund, and all employees, including the CEO, receive the same profit share.
Executives at Svenska’s headquarters are expected to support the decentralized approach through coaching, instead of through memos, instructions, and directives. If corporate managers disagree with a branch decision, they are expected to raise the issue through a short email or brief phone call, but the final decision ultimately remains with the local manager.
The implementation of change relies on managerial autonomy and shared leadership. ... Once a decision is made, managers charged with implementation are monitored, but not second-guessed. Strong-form performance management systems provide incentives for managers to follow through. Performance targets are objective and unambiguous; positive and negative consequences are real and transparent.
When we correlated the agility routine scores from the survey data with the firm performance results, a clear pattern emerged. Firms with high scores on three or four of the agility routines (strategizing, perceiving, testing, and implementing) are six times (18 percent vs. 3 percent) as likely to be outperformers in their industry. They are also twice as likely (30 percent vs. 15 percent) to have above-average ROAs between 51 and 79 percent of the time. Firms with only one or two of the agility routines, indicating an incomplete system, are much more likely to have below-average ROAs most of the time (see Exhibit 3). Although improving any one of these routines can make an organization more effective, agile companies, according to their own accounts, have at least three of these four traits in large supply.

Making Organizations More Agile

Developing the agile capability is no small feat, but it has been done. IBM, DaVita, and Harley-Davidson have all demonstrated that transformation is possible by committing to a systematic approach and following through. Even within this group, Harley-Davidson (H-D) stands out. It is one of a handful of companies in our sample that made the transition to agility. Its story demonstrates how organizations can build strategizing, perceiving, testing, and implementing routines.
H-D’s performance has been consistently higher than auto industry norms for more than 20 years (see Exhibit 4). Yet in 1980, the company was as good as dead. Its corporate parent at the time, American Machinery and Foundry (AMF), had put Harley-Davidson up for sale and found no takers. Japanese competitors like Honda had not only encroached on America’s last domestic motorcycle brand, but opened up entirely new segments of commuter and recreational users.
In 1981, Vaughn Beals and 12 other executives took Harley-Davidson private, buying it back from AMF. In a desperate bid for survival, they shrank the company by one-third, rapidly implemented Toyota production system techniques to improve product quality and reduce costs, and successfully petitioned the Reagan administration for the “Harley Tariff” on imported motorcycles over 700cc to give them some breathing room. In 1983, they formed the Harley Owners Group (HOG), a stroke of marketing genius that created the largest factory-sponsored club of its kind and enabled direct communications between H-D and its most fervent customers.
When Rich Teerlink took over as CEO in 1987, he inherited a company that had been rescued from the brink through a strong form of “command and control” management. Naturally, there were questions about whether Harley-Davidson could sustain its success without a crisis to compel its employees. But instead of clinging to a top-down management style, Teerlink and his senior management team engineered a further transformation of H-D using a model of shared leadership and accountability, continuous improvement, and investments in learning and development—practices that are all typically linked with agility. The company’s managers and employees were asked to go from a “tell me what you want me to do” style of managing others to a “given where we’re going, I’ll figure out what’s best to do” approach. Said Teerlink at the time, “I believe fundamentally that people should have the opportunity to influence their lives and their workplace.”
Teerlink and his management team took the company through a series of initiatives, including a “joint vision process” involving the top 130 executives. They clarified and codified Harley-Davidson’s identity, synchronized their planning and performance management to it, and set up an integrated, cascading goal-setting process that provided lines of sight from executives to the worker on the floor. Personal and organizational goals were incorporated into appraisals and variable compensation. Leadership and accountability were distributed throughout the organization. Along the way, Teerlink and other senior leaders paid close attention to the four routines of agility:
Strategizing dynamically. Prior to the buyout, H-D’s reputation and style had been rough, oily, and arrogant. Through strategy and organization changes that consistently emphasized the importance of customers, quality, and accountability, a new identity evolved, summarized in the company vision: “We fulfill dreams inspired by the many roads of the world by providing remarkable motorcycles and extraordinary customer experiences. We fuel the passion for freedom in our customers to express their own identity.”
Perceiving environmental change. At H-D, every employee engages with the outside world—particularly with customers. Through HOG, employees (including current CEO Keith Wandell) ride with customers, attend HOG rallies, and participate in sponsored musical and sporting events. The Harley-Davidson Museum in Milwaukee is a shrine that attracts 300,000 visitors each year. There is also constant formal and informal contact with H-D dealer and supplier networks, and an expanded website where customers can interact directly with marketing and product development. To help communicate the ideas that come in, H-D has a shallow hierarchy and little cultural tolerance for gatekeepers and apparatchiks who would impede or filter information flow to executives.
Testing responses. Managers routinely vet the ideas coming from HOG and dealer connections for viability. These ideas include marketing programs, model customizations, new motorcycle models, new engines, new styling, new manufacturing methods, new ways of working with customers, and new markets. H-D also adopted the quality movement practice of “plan–do–check–act,” wherein activities, processes, and decisions are improved on the basis of collected data, and the military practice of “after action reviews,” wherein participants in a campaign meet in intensive sessions to analyze successes and failures.
Implementing change. Harley-Davidson has repeatedly demonstrated its capacity for ongoing change. Since the leveraged buyout, it has implemented operational restructurings, a new product development process, new management processes and personnel practices, and expansion into Europe and Asia. In 2011, for example, the company embarked on an ambitious program to develop a full-blown mass customization capability. H-D reorganized and scaled down its manufacturing footprint, streamlined R&D, marketed a wide variety of customization options through dealers and the Web, and restructured the manufacturing process to a flexible system that can produce any custom version of any bike in any plant on any day. To accomplish this, the company engaged its unionized workforce to dramatically change work rules and move from 62 job classifications to five.
By the time Rich Teerlink retired in 1999, his team had transformed Harley-Davidson from an inward-looking, marginal, command-and-control organization to an agile, dynamic market leader permeated with shared leadership and accountability. Curiosity, experimentation, and direct action are explicitly encouraged and rewarded. But it is a controlled chaos, held together by the centripetal forces of a strong identity and shared values.

The Agility Challenge

Some business environments change faster and more profoundly than others, but it is a given that yours will change. The point of transformation is to adapt, and the point of pursuing agility is to become more adaptable. Executives in agile organizations make explicit, system-wide decisions that promote adaptability over stability and flexibility over inertia. Leaders and employees see the ability to change and adapt as the key to long-term success. They do not fear or avoid change; they embrace it because their ability to manage change well is their primary advantage.
Managing agile organizations means being willing to give up the activities that make you successful today but that won’t be appropriate tomorrow—over and over again. By contrast, thrashers often increase their commitment to successful courses of action but miss important inflection points in the market. BP, for instance, continued to emphasize cost performance over process safety and compliance for years, resulting in disasters like the 2005 Texas City refinery explosion that killed 15 and the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion and spill. Toyota was enamored with being the biggest auto company in the world and ignored important safety issues. Outperformers are not perfect, but they make fewer mistakes and, like Exxon, when they do stumble, they are quick to see the error and have the capabilities to correct it.
Perceiving the value of constant change is only the first step. Translating that perception into productive action requires know-how, processes, infrastructure, and resources. Leaders must commit the organization to a new course of action, mobilize resources, and implement changes. Niccolò Machiavelli’s insight is as relevant today as it was in the 15th century: “Whosoever desires constant success must change his conduct with the times.”

AUTHOR PROFILES:

  • Thomas Williams is a senior executive advisor with Booz & Company. Based in Ridgway, Colo., he specializes in strategy, organization, and management systems for energy and industrial companies.
  • Christopher G. Worley is a senior research scientist at the Center for Effective Organizations at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles. He is the coauthor, with Edward Lawler, ofManagement Reset: Organizing for Sustainable Effectiveness (Jossey-Bass, 2011).
  • Edward E. Lawler III is the director of the Center for Effective Organizations at USC; the coauthor, with Chris Worley, of Management Reset; and the author of Talent: Making People Your Competitive Advantage (Jossey-Bass, 2008).
  • Also contributing to this article was Niko Canner, former senior partner of Booz & Company; and s+bcontributing editor Jim O’Toole.




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Reassessing the Impact of Interim CEOs

CEO
CEO (Photo credits: www.myparkingsign.com)

Temporary appointments rarely result in poor firm performance


strategy+business magazine:

Southern Illinois University Carbondale
Southern Illinois University Carbondale (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Authors: Vincent J. Intintoli (Southern Illinois University, Carbondale), Andrew Zhang (University of Nevada, Las Vegas), and Wallace N. Davidson III (Southern Illinois University, Carbondale)
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
University of Nevada, Las Vegas (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Publisher: Journal of Management and Governance 
Date Published: December 2012 online; forthcoming in print
When a CEO steps down, most boards move quickly to hire a permanent replacement. But sometimes it makes more sense to name an interim successor, to give directors extra time to take stock of alternative candidates. It’s a risky move, though. Previous research has generally found that investors regard an interim appointment as a signal of failure by the board in its succession planning. Indeed, the few studies that have examined this scenario have suggested that firm performance is lower following an interim appointment than it is following a permanent hire.
However, it’s not quite as simple as that, according to this paper, which explores the reasons surrounding the predecessor’s decision to step down—specifically, whether it was a voluntary move, such as retirement, or whether the CEO was forced to depart as a result of board or shareholder pressure. Contrary to popular thought, the authors found that underperformance by interim CEOs was almost always restricted to cases involving a voluntary turnover—and that those cases were few in number.
In the study’s sample, nearly three out of four interim appointments came in the wake of forced CEO turnovers. In fact, interim successors were named in only 2.9 percent of the turnovers that involved a voluntary departure.
The authors based their findings on an analysis of turnovers from 1984 to 2007, using Forbes magazine’s annual compensation surveys of the largest 500 firms in the United States and information on S&P 1500 companies from the ExecuComp database. Consistent with prior research, the authors excluded turnovers related to mergers and acquisitions as well as interim successions that lasted less than 45 days. Overall, the sample consisted of 1,626 turnovers with 130 interim successions. Of the 1,626 turnovers, 1,275 were voluntary and 351 were forced; interim appointees were named in 37 voluntary cases and in 93 forced turnovers.
Accounts of departures were gleaned from database information and media reports. Voluntary turnovers were defined as those following a retirement or what the researchers called a surprise event—for example, when the CEO left to take another job, died, or stepped down for health reasons. Forced departures resulted from pressure applied by the board or founding family, or after the company was discovered to be involved in illegal activity or was embroiled in prolonged litigation.
After analyzing quarterly earnings reports, return on assets, and Tobin’s Q (the ratio of a company’s market value to the total value of its assets), the authors found almost no evidence of poor performance when boards hired interim CEOs following forced departures. What’s more, the poor performance of interim CEOs following voluntary departures was limited to operational metrics, and didn’t carry over to stock market returns.
Interim successions “do not necessarily signal a lack of strategic planning on the part of the board of directors and may represent an optimal response to the [departure] of the predecessor in cases of forced turnover,” the authors write.
Previous research has shown that forced departures are more likely to result in a power struggle among the top executives who remain at the firm, which can make it difficult for boards to identify and appoint a permanent successor immediately. An extended search process, therefore, could be beneficial in letting the executive suite settle down and in turning the firm around.
Bottom Line:
Interim CEOs’ reputation for presiding over declines in firm performance is undeserved. Companies fare worse only in the event that an interim replacement is named following a voluntary departure. However, the majority of interim appointments follow forced departures, and those CEOs appear to have a steady enough hand to afford the board time to find a suitable permanent replacement.


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We’re from Corporate and We’re Here to Help

Business Sign X
Business Sign X (Photo credits: www.roadtrafficsigns.com)

Understanding the real value of corporate strategy and the head office.

strategy+business magazine:

by Ken Favaro

Senior executives seeking to gauge the effectiveness of their company’s corporate strategy might look at any number of factors: the company’s shareholder returns, its growth rate, its market share, or its price-to-earnings multiple. ... In fact, they might lead executives to precisely the wrong conclusions.
The one true measure of a corporate strategy is the profitability of its head office. ... Of course, in strict accounting terms, corporate headquarters is a cost center because it has no revenues. ... In fact, a profitable corporate center is both literally and figuratively at the center of corporate profit itself.

Corporate Center Profitability

We define corporate center profitability as a company’s attributable performance delta—that is, the difference in financial performance that is attributable to the activities of the corporate center—less the costs of the center itself (see exhibit). By this definition, when the corporate center is profitable, the company is truly worth more than the sum of its parts ..., because the company’s business units (BUs) are outperforming ... in their markets. On the other hand, a company that has an unprofitable corporate center is sending a sure signal that it’s adding no real value to the individual BU strategies..., or worse, it’s a true hindrance to each BU being able to win in its own markets ... .
Research indicates that the performance delta is positive for 45 percent of all companies and negative for the rest. ... When your company’s performance delta is negative, neither your businesses nor your shareholders see much point in having a head office!

Drivers of Corporate Center Profitability

Corporate headquarters v2
Corporate headquarters v2 (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Six key functions explain the difference between “profitable” and “unprofitable” corporate centers.
First, profitable corporate centers sparingly use centralized services such as receivables, payables, financial reporting, payroll, IT, legal, HR, R&D, manufacturing, sourcing, and sales. They know that centralization does not come free—it can slow responsiveness, increase bureaucracy, uncouple costs from the revenues they support, and dilute accountability for top- and bottom-line results—and they know that there are diminishing returns to scale economies. ...
A second key function is capital allocation. The corporate center adds value only if it can do a better job of allocating capital than the “invisible hand” of a vast, liquid, and ruthless capital market. A profitable corporate center does just that by attaining and using its inside knowledge, its ability to actively engage with the business units, its experience with the businesses that make up the company’s portfolio, and a highly disciplined process for funding business units. In these cases, businesses perform better than their peers because they have corporate leaders who are knowledgeable, informed, engaged, experienced, disciplined, and enterprising investors. Unprofitable corporate centers tend to think of capital allocation as rationing rather than investing. ... It is common to see 80 percent of a company’s value creation coming from only 20 percent of its capital base. This is usually the work of corporate doing more harm than good in substituting for the capital markets.
Developing and deploying human capital is corporate’s third key function. Profitable corporate centers use the full breadth of the company’s business portfolio to offer a variety of flexible and rich career paths that will attract and develop people who can make a real difference to the BUs. ... They actively match the company’s strongest talent to its most important priorities, whether these are specific to particular businesses, span multiple businesses, or transcend them. Deadweight corporate headquarters facilitate inbreeding, cultural silos, and hoarding of talent within units. They do worse than what the talent markets do on their own, and they often do it with an enormous and costly corporate HR function. Sooner or later they are forced to go outside the company and pay a premium for the business talent they need.
Business unit governance processes are a fourth key function of corporate headquarters. ... But profitable corporate centers ... work hard to shield the BUs from the worst of short-term behavior—be it from customers, employees, or, especially, shareholders—while also holding their feet to the fire when it comes to producing results. They challenge and help shape the strategies that underpin the BUs’ plans, rather than just sit back and wait until those plans are submitted for corporate’s review and approval. ... They continually ask themselves, “How can we ensure that we are governing the BUs in ways that enable them to outperform in their markets?” ...
Unprofitable headquarters have a completely different attitude. They tend to ask, “How can the BUs help us do our job in running the company?” Thus, they tend to think of their governance role primarily as one of control and compliance rather than as one of adding value. In fact, in our experience, they are more likely to suck the life out of the BUs.
Perhaps the most valuable—and difficult—of all functions is the fifth: incubating, nurturing, and disproportionately investing in the company’s enterprise capabilities. An enterprise capability is something a company is able to do better than any other company. ... Profitable head offices actively identify capabilities anywhere in their organizations that can benefit all their businesses. They stay on alert for acquisitions that would enhance their businesses’ most important capabilities. They organize centers of excellence to nurture certain essential capabilities. They manage costs and capital to ensure that they are investing more and more effectively in their capabilities than any other company. If done well, this can be the most valuable role a corporate center plays in delivering a positive bottom line to the company.
Finally, profitable corporate centers know that their ability to add value depends greatly on the nature and complexity of the company’s portfolio shape. ... Companies with profitable corporate centers tend to be made up of businesses that draw on the same few essential capabilities. This coherence in the company’s portfolio makes it easier to add value through the other five functions.

Good vs. Bad Corporate Centers

Headquarters
Headquarters (Photo credit: Miroslav Petrasko (blog.hdrshooter.net))
Our research and experience tell us that unprofitable corporate centers tend to overestimate the benefits of centralized services and underestimate their costs. They tend to politicize capital allocation and human capital such that they achieve less than what the market’s invisible hand would produce on its own. They also tend to manage their portfolios to engineer certain financial outcomes in terms of growth, profitability, and risk. (For example, they buy high-growth businesses in order to lift the company’s overall growth rate or sell low-margin businesses to lift its average margin.)
Profitable ones, on the other hand, tend to invest heavily in effective internal governance and enterprise capabilities, and then fill their portfolios with businesses that gain the most from their specific governance skills and enterprise capabilities. ... Berkshire Hathaway ... famously has a bare-bones corporate headquarters, with no centralized services, no corporate HR department, and no sharing of enterprise capabilities across its vast, diverse portfolio of businesses. Yet by and large, those businesses consistently outperform in their markets. ... Berkshire oversees a mix of highly capital-intensive businesses (such as trains, utilities, and retail) and substantially cash-generative businesses (such as insurance and reinsurance)—both of which benefit greatly from Berkshire’s undeniable investment prowess. It may not be big, but Berkshire’s corporate center is highly profitable.
Corporate center profitability is the key gauge of whether a company is an accelerator, hindrance, or nonfactor in how well its businesses are able to compete and perform in their respective markets; it is the acid test of whether corporate is truly adding value in excess of its costs; and it is the true measure of a company’s corporate strategy. Every strategist should know what it is and how to achieve it.

AUTHOR PROFILE:

Ken Favaro is a senior partner with Booz & Company based in New York and global head of the firm’s enterprise strategy practice.

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