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Tuesday, April 13, 2010

Equity Analysts Still Too Bullish

After almost a decade of stricter regulation, analysts’ earnings forecasts continue to be excessively optimistic.

McKinsey Quarterly

APRIL 2010 • Marc Goedhart, Rishi Raj, and Abhishek Saxena

Corporate Finance, Performance article, Equity analysts Still too bullish

No executive would dispute that analysts’ forecasts serve as an important benchmark of the current and future health of companies. To better understand their accuracy, we undertook research nearly a decade ago … . Analysts, we found, were typically overoptimistic, slow to revise their forecasts to reflect new economic conditions, and prone to making increasingly inaccurate forecasts when economic growth declined.1

…[A] recently completed update of our work …reinforces this view—despite a series of rules and regulations … that were intended to improve the quality of the analysts’ long-term earnings forecasts, restore investor confidence in them, and prevent conflicts of interest.2 For executives, …this is a cautionary tale worth remembering.

Exceptions to the long pattern of excessively optimistic forecasts are rare, as a progression of consensus earnings estimates for the S&P 500 shows (Exhibit 1). Only in years such as 2003 to 2006, when strong economic growth generated actual earnings that caught up with earlier predictions, do forecasts actually hit the mark. This pattern confirms our earlier findings that analysts typically lag behind events in revising their forecasts to reflect new economic conditions. When economic growth accelerates, the size of the forecast error declines; when economic growth slows, it increases.3

Moreover, analysts have been persistently overoptimistic for the past 25 years, with estimates ranging from 10 to 12 percent a year,4 compared with actual earnings growth of 6 percent.5 Over this time frame, actual earnings growth surpassed forecasts in only two instances, both during the earnings recovery following a recession (Exhibit 2). On average, analysts’ forecasts have been almost 100 percent too high.6

Capital markets, on the other hand, are notably less giddy in their predictions. Except during the market bubble of 1999–2001, actual price-to-earnings ratios have been 25 percent lower than implied P/E ratios based on analyst forecasts (Exhibit 3). What’s more, an actual forward P/E ratio7 of the S&P 500 as of November 11, 2009—14—is consistent with long-term earnings growth of 5 percent.8 This assessment is more reasonable, considering that long-term earnings growth for the market as a whole is unlikely to differ significantly from growth in GDP,9 as prior McKinsey research has shown.10 Executives … ought to base their strategic decisions on what they see happening in their industries rather than respond to the pressures of forecasts, since even the market doesn’t expect them to do so.

About the Authors

Marc Goedhart is a consultant in McKinsey’s Amsterdam office; Rishi Raj and Abhishek Saxena are consultants in the Delhi office.

Notes

1 Marc H. Goedhart, Brendan Russell, and Zane D. Williams, “Prophets and profits,” mckinseyquarterly.com, October 2001.

2 US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD), passed in 2000, prohibits the selective disclosure of material information to some people but not others. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 includes provisions specifically intended to help restore investor confidence in the reporting of securities’ analysts, including a code of conduct for them and a requirement to disclose knowable conflicts of interest. The Global Settlement of 2003 between regulators and ten of the largest US investment firms aimed to prevent conflicts of interest between their analyst and investment businesses.

3 The correlation between the absolute size of the error in forecast earnings growth (S&P 500) and GDP growth is –0.55.

4 Our analysis of the distribution of five-year earnings growth (as of March 2005) suggests that analysts forecast growth of more than 10 percent for 70 percent of S&P 500 companies.

5 Except 1998–2001, when the growth outlook became excessively optimistic.

6 We also analyzed trends for three-year earnings-growth estimates based on year-on-year earnings estimates provided by the analysts, where the sample size of analysts’ coverage is bigger. Our conclusions on the trend and the gap vis-à-vis actual earnings growth does not change.

7 Market-weighted and forward-looking earnings-per-share (EPS) estimate for 2010.

8 Assuming a return on equity (ROE) of 13.5 percent (the long-term historical average) and a cost of equity of 9.5 percent—the long-term real cost of equity (7 percent) and inflation (2.5 percent).

9 Real GDP has averaged 3 to 4 percent over past seven or eight decades, which would indeed be consistent with nominal growth of 5 to 7 percent given current inflation of 2 to 3 percent.

10 Timothy Koller and Zane D. Williams, “What happened to the bull market?” mckinseyquarterly.com, November 2001.

Friday, April 9, 2010

The Upside of Irrationality

The discoveries by Duke’s Dan Ariely on how investors make decisions may transform your wealth management practice

4/1/2010

"We are all far less rational in our decision-making than standard economic theory assumes. Our irrational behaviors are neither random nor senseless: they are systematic and predictable. We all make the same types of mistakes over and over, because of the basic wiring of our brains."

That’s the financial world as Dan Ariely sees it. A professor of psychology and behavioral economics at Duke University, Dr. Ariely has wondered for years why people often don’t act in their own best interest. In 2008 he wrote about his research in Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions, which he updated last year with observations on the financial crisis. …

Other People’s Money Ariely disagrees with the assumption that people who deal with large amounts of money usually make more rational decisions about it. From investment bankers to mortgage brokers, he says, "a big part of the cause of the financial meltdown was conflict of interest."

While Ariely believes that most people are honest, he says that bad things can happen when you place good people into conflict-of-interest situations. "Imagine that I gave you $10 million a year if you were able to view mortgage-backed securities as a good product," he suggests. "Wouldn’t you be able to see them as better than they are? Of course you would."

What’s more, he adds, "when things like complex financial instruments are difficult to evaluate, it’s easier for us to rationalize unethical behavior and the effects of conflicts of interest become larger. Finally, when other people around us behave similarly, conflicts of interest rule even more." … Ariely concludes, "I think it’s inhumane to put people in strong conflict-of-interest situations and expect them to behave well."

… Interestingly, Ariely’s research finds that cheating is a lot more prevalent when it’s a step removed from cash. In Predictably Irrational, he recounts an experiment in which he first placed six cans of Coke in a refrigerator accessible to college students. All six cans were soon pilfered. He then placed six $1 bills on a plate in the same refrigerator. By the time he ended the experiment 72 hours later, none of the cash had been taken.

Ariely concludes, "When we deal with cash, we are primed to think about our actions as if we had just signed an honor code." … "When cash is taken away—and that’s what’s happening to our economic system," Ariely warns, "we will cheat by a factor bigger than we could ever imagine." Talk about a wake-up call.

Escaping Conflict-of-Interest Risks "This is a very hard time to have trust in financial advisors," Ariely says. He elaborates, "There are two kinds of trust: one is real trust, and the other is sticking a camera on someone to make sure they don’t behave badly." Today, we often opt for surveillance rather than trust. …

"Real trust is wonderful," Ariely says. But after this financial crisis, he feels that the time-consuming process of regaining it has to begin with a high degree of transparency. Unfortunately, Ariely told me, our government, legislators, and banks don’t seem to recognize what it will take to regain people’s confidence and trust. He keeps hoping some bank will break away from the herd to eliminate conflicts of interest and model full transparency—not just because it’s the moral thing to do, but because they understand that engendering trust is the best way to solve the liquidity problem. Without such bold actions, he fears we will not escape "this economic mess."

… Moving to fee-only compensation helps reduce conflict-of-interest perceptions, Ariely says, but it doesn’t solve everything. "Even with fee-only, they only get to keep the fee if they keep the client, so even if they really think at the moment that they’re doing the right thing, they’re biased to make the client happy." …

‘Hot States’ and Risk Tolerance In these turbulent times, investing in the stock market is not for the faint of heart. "The real issue for advisors is to protect people against themselves," Ariely says. He believes advisors can do more to help their clients truly understand how a loss would impact their life. "Imagine you come to me as your financial advisor," he suggests. "I ask how much are you willing to lose, and you say 20%. A little later I call you and say, ‘You lost 20%; do you want to change your risk tolerance?’"

Perceptions of any kind of risk can change dramatically when people go from a cold state, where they tend to make sound and rational decisions, to an emotional, hot state where they’re more likely to behave impulsively and irrationally. …

Ariely agrees with me that risk tolerance should be calibrated for a client’s cold state, while taking their hot (more emotional and risk-averse) state into account. In one experiment, he asked male college students whether they would engage in unsafe, kinky, or morally questionable sexual behavior. Most of the men responded negatively. Before questioning them again, he showed them erotic pictures. Thus aroused, the men were about twice as likely to say they would have unsafe sex or try to get an attractive woman drunk to seduce her. In short, they themselves failed to predict how they would feel when aroused. Other passions—rage, hunger, jealousy—may similarly make us strangers to ourselves….

Procrastination and Self-Control When emotions grab hold of us, we view the world from a different perspective. In a cold state, as Ariely calls it, we promise to save money, exercise, diet, and so on. But when we are in a hot state or aroused in some way, we feel that we have to have that new car, designer shoes, e-reader, etc. To help people start saving more money, Ariely came up with a creative idea: a "self-control" credit card that allows users to restrict their own spending behavior. Cardholders would set spending limits for clothes, entertainment, food, whatever. …

When Ariely presented this innovative concept to one of the major banks a few years ago, its executives could relate to everything he said about the terrible human costs of impulsive overspending. But when he went on to describe his idea, they seemed dumbfounded. Ariely argued that if one bank had the courage to offer consumers a card that helped them control debt and accumulate retirement savings, people would cut up their other cards and flock to this bank.

Despite the bankers’ promise to follow up on the idea, nothing ever happened. Ariely wonders if this was due to procrastination or to a conflict of interest: i.e., the potential loss of up to $17 billion in interest charges. …

Ariely comes back to the problem of not saving enough for retirement in Predictably Irrational. He blames "good old procrastination," as well as people’s inability to understand "the real cost of not saving as well as the benefits of saving." Along with the self-control credit card, he favors the Save More Tomorrow plan devised by Richard Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi. In the plan’s first implementation, a company’s new employees were asked to commit in advance to investing a portion of future raises in retirement savings. Since promising to change one’s behavior in the future is relatively painless, 78% of those eligible took part, increasing their average savings rate from 3.5% to 11.6% over the following 28 months. Ariely calls ideas like these "free lunches" that benefit all the parties involved.

Creating Loyalty: Money vs. Mutual Aid Another aspect of our predictable irrationality around money relates to loyalty toward others. In a purely social environment, people often make generous and altruistic choices. But the moment money is introduced, we lose our altruistic impulses and want to get the best possible deal for ourselves. This can become a problem for a business that insists it cares about its customers and/or employees. … A company can’t have it both ways, Ariely says. "If you want a social relationship, go for it, but remember that you have to maintain it under all circumstances."…

… Ariely points out in Predictably Irrational, money is an expensive way to motivate people. … "In a market where employees’ loyalty to their employers is often wilting, social norms are one of the best ways to make workers loyal, as well as motivated," he argues. Treating employees like "family" or members of a team tends to make them more "passionate, hard-working, flexible, and concerned." However, companies that model a social exchange must remember that they can’t expect employees to take on more work, put in longer hours, and travel at the drop of a hat without providing loyalty in return. This means helping them when they’re sick and keeping them employed when a market slump threatens their jobs. …

The Paradox of Big Paychecks After experimenting with different levels of salary and job performance, Ariely concludes that financial rewards can be a double-edged sword: "They motivate people to work well, but when these financial rewards get very large they can become counterproductive and actually hurt performance." When people start making tremendously high compensation, he explains, they are driven by the amount of the bonus, the stress involved in attaining it, and the fear of not getting it, instead of doing the best job they can. …

Asking the Right Question Sometimes we’re so intent on acting rationally that we don’t realize we’ve veered off into irrationality. For example, Ariely points out that during the mortgage market bubble, home buyers accepted that the key question was "How much house can I afford?" Many who believed the answer (and borrowed the maximum) have ended up defaulting. No one asked the right question: "Given our financial situation, how much should we spend on a house?" or its corollary: "How much should we borrow on a 30-year mortgage?"

Ariely says this is a lesson in human decision-making. When we can’t determine the right answer to the question facing us, we often figure out the answer to a slightly different question and apply this to the original problem. …

Why Can’t We Plan Better? "Rational economics is useful, but it offers just one type of input into our understanding of human behavior," Ariely writes in Predictably Irrational. "Relying on it alone is unlikely to help us maximize our long-term welfare." He cites several ways our emotions can hinder us from doing what’s in our best interest:

1. Relativity Error.

We often think we’re making enough money until we hear of someone in a similar job who earns more. …The only cure for this vicious cycle of "the more we have, the more we want," Ariely says, is to stop comparing oneself to others. …

2. The "Free" Fancy. Ariely’s research shows that once something is offered for free, people will stampede to get it, even if it winds up costing them money at a later date. …

3. Ownership Bias.

Simply put, we think what we own is worth more than it really is. Ariely finds that decisions to sell something (a car, a house) and buy a replacement are influenced by three human quirks: we fall in love with what we already have, focus on what we may lose instead of what we may gain, and assume other people will see things from our perspective. He counsels himself (and us) to "try to view all transactions (particularly large ones) as if I were a non-owner, putting some distance between myself and the item of interest." …

4. The "Price Equals Value" Perception. Ariely phrases this as "why a 50-cent aspirin can do what a penny aspirin can’t." …If you’ve been afraid to raise your rates even a little, you might try testing this irrational belief that more expensive goods and services are better.

5. The Planning Fallacy.

… Ariely adds that we often can’t plan well because we underestimate how long it will take to complete a task. This trips us up in deciding what we can and can’t afford, and what we should and shouldn’t buy. As a result, many of us don’t have a cushion when the unexpected happens.

Using Predictable Irrationality for Good As predictably irrational beings, Ariely says, "we are pawns in a game whose forces we largely fail to comprehend." We think of ourselves as sitting in the driver’s seat, but in reality our decisions are limited by the tools nature has given us. …

On a personal level, it’s good to be vigilant about a tendency to act emotionally. "Trust your intuition only after you have evidence that it’s useful," Ariely counsels. "Intuition is based on emotions, which are all about the short term; investment decisions are not."

… Ariely suggests that when you’re facing a hiring decision or deciding who to date, try testing your intuition by doing the opposite and seeing if it works out. Otherwise, you’ll never know whether or not your instinct is right. Don’t be discouraged by mistakes; they’re very educational. …

He also advises combining "immediate, powerful, and positive reinforcements with the not-so-pleasant steps we have to take toward our long-term objectives." An example might be watching a favorite TV show while exercising on a treadmill.

On a larger scale, businesses and policymakers could develop products and procedures that help us overcome our inability to act in our best interests, so we can make better decisions and improve our lives. In Predictably Irrational, Ariely quotes a Duke University colleague, Ralph Keeney, as saying that "our inability to make smart choices and overcome our own self-destructive behaviors" leads nearly half of us to early graves.

But we are not helpless. Ariely, who is already at work on a new book titled The Upside of Irrationality, urges us to "learn to embrace the Homer Simpson within us, with all our flaws and inabilities." By taking our predictable irrationality into account when we design schools, health plans, and other strategies, tools, and systems, we can create a better world. "This," he says, "is the real promise of behavioral economics."

SIDEBARS Stuck in the Status Quo? Why Women Should Take the Wheel Ariely on Retirement Planning The Risk of Parental Lassez-Faire Professor Ariely's Insights: In Brief


Olivia Mellan

, a speaker, coach, and business consultant, is the author with Sherry Christie of The Client Connection: How Advisors Can Build Bridges That Last, available through the Investment Advisor Bookstore at www.invest-store.com/investmentadvisor. She also offers money psychology teleclasses for financial advisors and for the general public. E-mail Olivia at moneyharmony@cs.com.

Smaller And Medium Size Companies Hot Targets For Mergers And Acquisitions

Portfolio.com

by Suzanne McGee Apr 09 2010

Deals

Image: iStockphoto and Sean Driscoll

This is shaping up to become one of the hottest markets for baby boomer owners of family businesses or other entrepreneurs who are interested in selling their companies.

For several months now, massive transactions such as the grueling battle for control of Cadbury PLC (in which Kraft Foods Inc. and its $21.4 billion bid finally triumphed in February) have been stirring a sense of revival in the long-dormant merger and acquisition market. But the real action—and much of longer-term profit for Wall Street—rides on what is happening behind the scenes, in the arena where mid-market M&A is structured.

R.W. Baird, one of the many investment banks specializing in deals involving small to mid-market companies, noted that the number of M&A transactions involving these businesses soared 31.6 percent above year-earlier levels in February alone to 799 transactions. The dollar value of those transactions hit $107 billion, a 544 percent increase.

Confirming the trend, the National Venture Capital Association last week reported that the first quarter of 2010 saw more M&A deals involving venture-backed companies than it has recorded in any quarterly period since it began keeping track way back in 1975. A total of 111 venture capital-financed companies were negotiated in the first three months of the year, …. And the value of those deals? Well, that hit an average of $180.2 million—21 percent than the average value of deals done in all of 2009.

What that means, investment bankers agree, is that this is shaping up to become one of the hottest markets for baby boomer owners of family businesses or other entrepreneurs who are interested in selling their companies. Strategic buyers—larger rivals—are eager to boost their revenues and profits, and an acquisition is the most straightforward way to do that after they have spent the last two or three years cutting costs to the bone.

Mid-market buyout funds, … are heading back into the market and hunting for attractive deals. “For a high-quality company that has run into a glass ceiling—it has operational barriers to growth or can’t go global on its own or is struggling to find capital for further expansion—the M&A environment couldn’t be better right now,” says Parker Weil, a mid-market banker and managing director at Bank of America.

While everyone is peering over the shoulders of giant players like Blackstone and KKR, eager to see what kind of coup they will pull of next, Weil says there are 150 or so buyout shops in the tier just below that, each of which could complete 10 to 20 acquisitions over the next 18 months. Then there are the corporate buyers, who have also emerged from the shadows. “They need to show growth, and they can’t always do that organically,” Weil says….

Parker Weil, who also is involved in a seemingly endless series of conversations with entrepreneurs and owners interested in selling their businesses and eager buyers and investors who are willing to help finance the transactions, … The mid-market is the sweet spot of the M&A universe, he argues, calculating the optimal deal value at around $500 million. …

These days, Wall Street is drawing the ire of critics of its proprietary dealmaking and trading businesses, operations that have been very profitable, but that various reform proposals seek to curb, make less profitable or eliminate altogether. Going forward, the question may be whether Wall Street firms find a new source of more stable earnings to replace that, in the form of fees that can be levied on the assets its brokers and wealth managers manage for those clients who use their M&A teams to sell their businesses.

It will be up to those clients—the entrepreneurs seizing the opportunity to find a buyer for their business in what several bankers described to StreetWise as the beginning of a boom in mid-market M&A—to decide if they want to contribute to Wall Street’s well-being by entrusting them with their liquid wealth. …

Even better, suggests Josh Lerner of the Harvard Business School, if they do decide to respond to those initiatives, “this will be more of a seller’s market as we move forward. If a recession is kind of like the Grim Reaper, causing a lot of companies to fall by the wayside, it also means that those smaller and entrepreneurial businesses that survive are the strongest.” With a bevy of these robust survivors available—at least some of whose owners and CEOs have been reminded that when credit crunches hit, smaller businesses tend to suffer disproportionately—no wonder mid-market dealmaking is the hottest part of the M&A universe.

Read more: http://www.portfolio.com/industry-news/banking-finance/2010/04/09/smaller-and-medium-size-companies-hot-targets-for-mergers-and-acquisitions/index1.html#ixzz0kcc1XTSH

Wednesday, April 7, 2010

Momentum builds for annuities in 401(k) plans

Employee Benefit Adviser

By Lee Barney

April 1, 2010

More retirement think tanks are getting on board with the idea of including annuities in 401(k) plans, but so far, only a handful of large employers have this as an option.

“They are complicated,” explains Alicia H. Munnell, director of the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College. …

Furthermore, investors are afraid an insurance carrier could go out of business, and plan sponsors don’t like the administrative headache of switching annuity investments when workers change jobs, added Robyn Credico, a consultant with Towers Watson.

In addition, the Retirement Security Project at Brookings Institution recently spelled out a number of perceived problems with annuities among investors: “… Consumers find themselves mystified by annuities’ complex provisions and worry that insurance companies are pricing their products unfairly. …”

Nonetheless, the Obama administration recently came out in favor of annuities, and the Department of Labor and Treasury Department are gathering information on the feasibility of including annuities in 401(k)s.

The 401(k)helpcenter.com, which serves plan sponsors, advocates the creation of a federal insurance fund similar to the FDIC to guarantee annuities.

Meanwhile, The Retirement Security Project recommends either automatic annuitization once workers reach age 45, with the right to opt out, or moving 50% of a worker’s savings into an annuity upon retirement. — By Lee Barney, editor-in-chief, Money Management Executive magazine.

Negotiation the fiduciary delegation minefield

PLANSPONSOR.com

ERISA requires every employee benefit plan to [have] a “named fiduciary.” The named fiduciary—typically a fiduciary committee or board of trustees—is the person or entity that has the ultimate authority to control and manage the operation and administration of the plan.

…ERISA permits named fiduciaries to delegate responsibility for managing plan assets to an investment manager. … Where an investment manager is properly appointed under ERISA, a plan’s named fiduciary will not be liable for the investment manager’s day-to-day management of plan assets, resulting in protection for the named fiduciary. In order to be appointed properly, an investment manager must acknowledge in writing that it is a fiduciary with respect to the plan. The named fiduciary’s only responsibility is to select the investment manager prudently and to monitor the investment manager’s performance periodically to determine whether continuing to retain the investment manager is prudent.

Investment Manager Responsibilities Investment managers have traditionally taken full responsibility for the portfolio of assets they are appointed to manage … . However, as investment managers increasingly have begun to implement more-complex investment strategies, … managers frequently are requesting that named fiduciaries execute ancillary documentation with third-party service providers to facilitate the investment managers’ services.

For example, we recently encountered several instances where an investment manager asked plan fiduciaries to execute a contract with a third-party futures commission merchant to facilitate the investment manager’s use of futures in the portfolio it managed on behalf of the plan. … However, the named fiduciary did not have the expertise to determine whether the terms of the contract were appropriate for the plan or whether the futures commission merchant selected by the investment manager was a good choice … .

When confronted with this kind of situation, named fiduciaries ought to consider whether, by signing ancillary contracts, they potentially are taking on additional liability for the responsibilities they previously delegated to an investment manager. In the previous example, a named fiduciary who signed the contract with the futures commission merchant could later be deemed responsible for the terms of the contract and for the selection of the particular futures commission merchant. …

Strategies for Plan Fiduciaries Several options may be available for named fiduciaries in this situation. Named fiduciaries, … may wish to retain an experienced investment professional to whom they can delegate this authority. In addition, the plan’s directed trustee may have negotiated agreements with providers like futures commission merchants, and may be willing to take direction from the investment manager to execute such agreements on behalf of the plan.

Regardless of the approach selected, named fiduciaries ought to be aware that they may be subjecting themselves to potential liability when they execute ancillary documentation at the request of investment managers.


Stephen M. Saxon is a Partner with the Washington-based Groom Law Group. Groom is one of the preeminent employee ­benefits firms in the country. Steve and his colleagues have worked on virtually every major legislative and regulatory initiative affecting employee benefits since the enactment of ERISA.